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Machines that replace physical labor have allowed us to focus more on what makes us human: 
our minds. Intelligent machines will continue that process, taking over the more menial aspects 
of cognition and elevating our mental lives toward creativity, curiosity, beauty, and joy. These 
are what truly make us human, not any particular activity or skill like swinging a hammer - or 
even playing chess. (Kasparov 2017, 10) 
 
1.1 Main aims and claims   
 
The central aim of this thesis is to investigate and argue against the claim that 
consciousness is required for creativity. I address this claim, because it is important 
for answering the question of whether computers can be creative. 
There is a core sense of “creativity”, such that creative actions are carried out 
by creative agents, whose creative achievements we are justified in celebrating and 
appreciating. This is different than appreciating the beauty of a sunset, or marveling 
at all the variety of forms of life on earth brought about by evolution. These natural 
processes might be “creative”, but in a different sense than I will use here. When asking 
if computers can be creative, we should employ the core sense of “creativity”, such that 
creativity is the work of agents and not solely the result of natural processes, luck or 
mechanical operation. Given this core sense of “creativity”, then, creativity is agency-
driven, highly valuable and praised in society; and further, it appears in response to a 
problem or challenge, across domains.   
 However, what does this core sense of “creativity” imply for the role of 
consciousness in creativity: does such creativity require consciousness? This is 
important to ask, because if creativity requires conscious agents, then a computer 
must be conscious to be creative; and it is unclear whether computers can be 
conscious. My thesis is a contribution to the discussion of the question of whether 
computers can be creative. In order to address this question, I will draw on the 
philosophical literature on creativity, artificial intelligence and consciousness. 
I will structure this thesis around one argument:  
(1) Creativity requires consciousness; 
(2) computers cannot be conscious; therefore, 




Since this is a valid argument, it is impossible for the conclusion ‘computers 
cannot be creative’ to be false if the premises are true. To disprove the argument, I 
need to refute only one of the two premises. I will argue that the first premise is false. 
Disproving this argument will not prove that computer creativity is possible; it will 
only show that this particular argument fails to show the impossibility of computer 
creativity. 
 
1.2 Some terminology 
 
To help the reader better understand the question ‘Can computers be creative?’, I will 
first define a few terms. I explore “creativity” in greater detail in Chapter 2, so for now 
I will briefly introduce the standard view of creativity in philosophy, according to 
which “creativity” is the ability to produce artifacts or ideas that are novel and valuable. 
“Artifacts” are products or ideas produced by agents. The use of “artifact” or “idea” 
disqualifies as creative processes those which produce novel or valuable products, but 
are not the work of an agent. In accordance with this standard view, we tend not to 
think of things like sunsets as “creative” in this core sense, because we know that the 
novel and valuable result of scattered light rays hitting the atmosphere is not the 
product of an agent. 
An “agent” is generally thought of as a “being with the capacity to act” 
(Schlosser 2015). An “act” or “action” is something we genuinely do, as opposed to 
something that happens to us. “Acting”, in this sense, implies certain causal properties 
– that “I” initiate certain behaviors. However, actions like ‘coughing’ must be 
distinguished from actions like ‘writing a novel’. I initiate both, but only the latter 
involves “intention” and “intentional actions” (ibid.). Chapter 3 will elaborate on this 
distinction. 
Finally, I will define how I am using the term “computer”. A modern 
understanding of “computer” is that it is  
an electronic device (or system of devices) which is used to store, manipulate, and communicate 
information, perform complex calculations, or control or regulate other devices or machines, 
and is capable of receiving information (data) and of processing it in accordance with variable 






My aim in this section is to show why the question about computer creativity is worth 
thinking about philosophically. I will also briefly address some objections to the 
proposed motivation. 
 Increasingly, computers are doing the work that humans used to do. This move 
towards automation is justified by the evidence that computers generally perform 
these tasks better and are therefore safer, more efficient, more accurate, etc. 
Furthermore, it is typically thought that computer automation will allow people the 
freedom to pursue more creative activity, to add more value to their life. Being creative, 
in turn, is considered crucial to living a good life in that it increases one’s sense of self-
worth. But what if computers themselves would become creative? Creative computers 
would be more likely to resolve many of the problems they encounter. Thus it seems 
natural to assume that computer scientists and programmers would continue their 
attempts to model and formalize creativity. However, if creativity is essential for 
human self-worth and sense of purpose, then creative computers may negatively 
impact humanity.  
To better understand this claim, and consider an objection, we can look at the 
cases of Chess and Go, where two computers, Deep Blue and AlphaGo, beat the 
reigning world champions in their respective games. Chess and Go were, for a long 
time, considered classic examples of human intellectual achievement. Before Chess 
champion Garry Kasparov lost to the Chess supercomputer Deep Blue in 1996, he 
claimed he was playing to help “defend our dignity” (Wright 1996, Time). It was much 
the same scene twenty years later when world Go champion Lee Sedol lost to Google 
DeepMind’s AlphaGo (a Go-playing supercomputer):  
 
Lee Sedol openly apologized to the Korean public and the wider Go community (and, perhaps, 
humans in general) for losing the match, tapping an undeniable melancholy among those 
gathered to watch the match inside Seoul's Four Seasons hotel. (Metz 2017, Wired) 
 
Computers have surpassed human abilities in these games, but this does not threaten 
our self-worth. I think this can be explained by the fact that Chess and Go are games, 
not problems to be solved. As games, they are fun to play, so people will continue to 
play them despite computer capabilities. At first glance, the same line of thinking could 
apply for creativity, as well: It is fun to be creative, therefore we will continue to be 
creative, even if computers are creative.  
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The difference is that creativity is a response to a situation, i.e. a ‘creative 
solution’. People are creative in game-playing, but the game is not dependent (for its 
existence) on not being solved. In this regard, I have two assumptions: (1) the core 
sense of agency driven creativity is the same concept across different domains; and (2) 
that creativity is always a case of problem-solving. I will explain (1) in Chapter 2 when 
I make the distinction between the subjective creativity of the agent and the objective 
creativity of artifacts or ideas. Regarding (2), aestheticians might object: “the artist, 
unlike the scientist, is not standardly confronted with problems to solve” (Gaut 2010, 
1038). This is the appeal of art pour l’art, that “under the sun there neither exists nor 
can exist any work more thoroughly dignified, more supremely noble, than this poem 
which is a poem and nothing more, this poem written solely for the poem's sake” (Poe 
1850, 5). The expression “for the poem’s sake” works because artists value their art, 
Poe even appeals to the nobility of the act. But one could make the same argument for 
murder, ‘murder for murder’s sake’. I would say that artists value art, therefore art is 
worth pursuing, and so creating art has a purpose. Nietzsche says “does his basic 
instinct aim at art, or rather at the sense of art, at life? at a desirability of life? Art is 
the great stimulus to life: how could one understand it as purposeless, as aimless, as 
l'art pour l'art?” (Nietzsche 1889. §24, 80). If creativity is always a response to a 
problem, and computers will be tasked with solving problems across domains, it is safe 
to assume that human creativity could be superseded by computer creativity.  
In this section, I showed how creative computers could challenge human self-
worth. Humans add value to their lives by being creative. Creativity is a valuable 
problem-solving resource and so there are strong incentives to make computers 
creative. Computers are already taking over many human tasks and outperform 
humans in more and more diverse domains. Perhaps creative computers could even 
take over all problem-solving. If this happens, it will be hard to know how human 
beings can continue to add value to their lives. In this way, human self-worth is 
challenged by creative computers. 
 
1.4 Outlining the thesis 
 
Thus far, I have presented the argument I am looking at and I have stated my main 
aim, which is to argue against the first premise, i.e. that creativity requires 
consciousness. I have also shown why the question about computer creativity is worth 
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considering (because creative computers may challenge human self-worth). I will 
spend the bulk of the rest of my thesis on creativity, first defining “creativity” (Chapter 
2) and then addressing the first premise of the master argument: ‘Creativity requires 
consciousness’ (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 will deal with the second premise: ‘Computers 
cannot be conscious’. In Chapter 5, I will provide some concluding remarks. 
More precisely, in the second chapter, I will discuss the standard view of 
creativity and address some issues with the “novelty” and “value” conditions of the 
standard view. I will consider “creativity” to be applicable across all domains of human 
activity, so I will briefly explain why science should be treated as a creative enterprise 
(against Kant). I will distinguish between subjective and objective creativity and 
defend my focus on subjective creativity: the psychological aspect of creativity (which 
involves the experiences of the creator). Finally, I will try to rehabilitate the standard 
view against the arguments of Hills and Bird, according to which creativity need not 
include the value condition. 
In the third chapter, I will assess the first premise of the consciousness 
argument, that creativity requires consciousness. I will look at traditional views of 
creativity that Berys Gaut classifies under “passive creativity”: views according to 
which creative acts do not result from the agent’s conscious efforts. The consideration 
of these views motivates turning to contemporary literature on the role of the 
unconscious. These contemporary views might help explain the origins of creative 
ideas without appealing to gods or madness. “Passive creativity” is contrasted with 
“active creativity”, which involves conscious deliberation in the use of imagination, 
which, I will show, is not necessary for creativity. I will also address the four conditions 
that Berys Gaut lays out in his agency-view of creativity, which involves the standard 
view (the novelty and value conditions), plus “flair”. “Flair” is shorthand for 
purposefulness, understanding, judgment and evaluative ability. I will ask whether 
these conditions are necessary for creativity and whether they entail consciousness. 
In the fourth chapter, I will assess the second premise of the consciousness 
argument – that computers cannot be conscious – by looking at John Searle’s 
argument that a functional simulation of a conscious state like ‘understanding’ does 
not qualify as real understanding. I will assess Paul and Patricia Churchland’s 
response to Searle, along with their dismissal of the Turing Test as a measure of 
conscious intelligence. I will then look at Daniel Dennett’s defense of the Turing Test. 
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Finally, I will address several arguments for and against conscious computers from 
Daniel Dennett and Hilary Putnam.  
I will conclude my thesis with a brief summary of the ideas I have discussed 
and delineate concluding remarks outlining the specific role (if any) of consciousness 





2. DEFINING CREATIVITY 
 
In this chapter, I will build towards a working definition of creativity. To begin with, I 
will look at how other philosophers have defined creativity. Then, I will characterize 
creativity as consisting of three necessary parts: agent, process and product. It is safe 
to say that these distinctions underlie all examples of creativity. Next, I will analyze a 
recurring theme in descriptions of the creative process: the distinction between 
“generation” and “selection” as phases of the creative process. Similarly, I think that 
this distinction applies to all examples of creativity. Finally, I will investigate both 
‘novelty’ and ‘value’, as the standard necessary conditions in definitions of creativity, 
and point to issues related to each one. I conclude the chapter by introducing a 
modification of the standard view. According to that modification, creativity aims at 
value, though it does not always succeed. The overall account of creativity I give 
emphasizes the role of ‘taste’ as the active ingredient in all relevant cases of creativity. 
Taste seems to involve consciousness; namely the subjective experience of ‘qualia’ or 
phenomenal consciousness (that there is something it is like to enjoy x). Therefore, 
this conclusion will pave the way for exploring the role of consciousness in creativity 
in Chapter 3.  
 
2.1 Definitions of creativity 
 
The standard view of creativity is that it is the ability to produce novel and valuable 
ideas or artifacts. The first chapter emphasized the core, intuitive sense of creativity, 
which involves ‘artifacts’ as created by beings with a capacity to act, as opposed to 
‘objects’ created by natural processes or luck. Most philosophers define creativity with 
variations on those central conditions of ‘novelty’ or ‘value’, each with their own 
nuance and particular emphasis on one or both, along with a variety of supporting 
features. I will point out some of those supplemental features when looking at different 
philosophers’ conceptions of creativity. For now, it is helpful to think of creativity as I 
have defined it above; but note that the conditions of novelty and value are not without 
philosophical contention, which I will highlight later in this chapter. 
Margaret Boden, who exemplifies the standard view, defines creativity as “the 
ability to come up with ideas or artifacts that are new, surprising and valuable” (Boden 
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2010, 29). For Boden, ideas and artifacts include poems, musical compositions, 
cooking recipes, jokes, paintings, origami, penny whistles, steam engines, etc. (ibid.). 
Given the many tokens of creativity on display here, it is apparent that creativity 
features in nearly every aspect of life. Boden even says creativity is “an aspect of human 
intelligence in general” (ibid.). Because creativity, so understood, is a stable feature of 
human intelligence, she states that “every one of us is creative, to a degree” (ibid., 30).  
Maria Kronfeldner’s view is another example of the standard view. She cites Boden’s 
definition of creativity and also Sternberg and Lubart’s definition, according to which 
“creativity is the ability to produce work that is both novel (i.e., original, unexpected) 
and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive concerning task constraints)” (Kronfeldner 
2009, 578). Kronfeldner’s own definition of creativity is that “creativity, in its basic 
sense, is the human capacity to create new and valuable responses to challenges to 
which humans are exposed, or to which they expose themselves” (Kronfeldner 2014, 
vii).  
Both Boden and Kronfeldner see creativity as existing in every domain. 
Immanuel Kant, however, distinguishes the sciences from the arts, specifically fine art, 
and ties his notion of genius (creativity) only to works of fine art, but not to the sciences 
(Kant 1790/1987, §46, §47). The relevant sense of “creativity” here applies to all 
domains; so I must argue against Kant regarding creativity in the sciences. Let me first 
present his reasoning, and in doing so, I will give Kant’s definition of creativity as well. 
According to Kant, creativity is exhibited by genius, and genius is “the innate mental 
predisposition through which nature gives the rule to art” (ibid., 174). What Kant is 
saying, more precisely, is that creativity is a ‘natural talent’ which exists in the agent’s 
ability to communicate to the general audience via ‘the understanding’ the universally 
shared expressions of beauty and sublimity present in nature, through the creation of 
an object of fine art. Fine art is differentiated from craft or the lighter agreeable art 
(art simply for pleasure), in that fine art not only appeals to pleasures but is cognitively 
stimulating, by exciting in the audience the same spirit which the artist had when 
creating.  
The mental predisposition that is sufficient for creating art cannot just be 
expressing oneself in a particular artistic medium; for not all such products exhibit 
good taste. Likewise, applying good taste is not sufficient for creating art; if that were 
the case, then any art critic would be an artist. Mediocre products lack spirit, which 
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Kant calls the “animating principle of the mind” (ibid §49, 181). He considers the 
excitations of the audience to mimic the experience of creating. Accordingly, if a work 
of fine art is the product of genius, then the audience will find it both pleasurable and 
cognitively stimulating. Not only does Kant presuppose a mental process in creativity, 
but he also distinguishes between two aspects of the creative process: generation and 
selection. “Genius provides the ‘matter’ for fine art (generation), taste provides the 
‘form’” (selection) (Burnham IEP Immanuel Kant: Aesthetics). 
Kant’s definition of creativity departs from the assumption that the genius 
creates in such a way that no determinate rule can be given for it. Therefore “its 
foremost property is originality”; but “since nonsense too can be original”, products of 
genius must also be exemplary (Kant 1987 §46, 175). So here we have two very similar 
conditions to those given above by Boden and Kronfeldner: the products must be 
original (the novelty condition) and exemplary (the value condition). But Kant adds 
something to the standard view when he claims that the genius cannot know or explain 
how their ideas came about. This allows him to argue that scientists are not creative. 
“Genius must be considered the very opposite of a spirit of imitation” (Kant 1987 §47, 
176) and if learning is imitation, then great scientific discoveries could be learned as 
well; this is the “natural path of an investigation and meditation by rules” (ibid.). Kant 
says one can learn everything Newton put forward in his principles of natural 
philosophy because Newton can show how every one of his steps came together from 
start to finish. But no “Homer or Wieland can show how his ideas, rich in fancy and 
yet also in thought, arise and meet in his mind; the reason is that he himself does not 
know and hence also cannot teach it to anyone else” (ibid., 177). 
Because I consider “creativity” applicable to the sciences as well as the arts, I 
need to challenge Kant’s view. Ted Cohen puts forward a strong case against Kant’s 
reasoning. Kant claims that Newton’s work is entirely explicable in terms of concepts. 
However, Cohen states that despite the fact that “Newton’s Principia is explicable 
conceptually, nothing whatsoever follows about how, in fact, Newton produced the 
work” (Cohen 2003, 140). Cohen emphasizes that Newton’s presentation of his 
discovery “may or may not mirror his own initial reasoning” (ibid.). In other words, 
the products of scientific labor tell us nothing about how the ideas came to be.  
Cohen gives an example from his own experience in which he was tasked with 
trying to understand one of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. In coming to a full 
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understanding, Cohen explored various proofs from professors and other writers, but 
had not actually engaged Gödel’s original texts. When Cohen had a strong 
understanding of the First Incompleteness Theorem, he inferred that Gödel himself 
probably went through the same steps that Cohen had. Later, when he approached the 
source texts, he was “surprised at some of the features of Gödel’s own exposition” and 
found that he had even less of an idea how Gödel himself came to his conclusions. 
Cohen’s conclusion, which I agree with, is  
 
...that it is an error to suppose that the discovery of these theses proceeded as proofs do. And it 
is still a mistake to suppose that the author must have followed some particular series of steps 
in arriving at his discovery and that these steps must be capable of being articulated 
conceptually (ibid.). 
 
As the next chapter will show, there are many scientific discoveries which appear 
completely unlike the logical entailment of one idea to the next, and many 
introspective reports even border on the mystical. The “magic” of the initial idea is the 
real mystery and that mystery seems to be there both in the arts and in the sciences.  
In this section, I have presented the standard view of creativity and looked at 
three different philosophers’ accounts of creativity: Margaret Boden, Maria 
Kronfeldner, and Immanuel Kant. I have shown how the concepts of “novelty” and 
“value” are staples of all these definitions. I also discussed Kant’s argument against 
creativity in the sciences and found that, following Cohen, we should consider 
creativity as existing in the sciences as well. In the next section, I will look at creativity 
in terms of the agent, the process and the product. 
 
2.2 Creativity of agent, process and product  
 
“The term ‘creative’ is used to describe three kinds of things: a person, a process or 
activity, or a product, whether it is an idea in someone’s mind or an observable 
performance or artifact” (Kaufman, S., & Paul, B. 2014, 6). There is disagreement 
about which of these three aspects (if any) are fundamental to creativity. If creativity 
is the same concept across different domains, there must be something essential to 
creativity which can be represented in each domain. This section will look at each of 
these parts and defend focusing on the creator as the fundamental aspect of the three. 
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 “Objective creativity” focuses on the artifacts of creative achievement. Looking 
at the artifacts cannot tell us if creativity has taken place. For example, the formula for 
mass-energy equivalence - “E=mc2” - does not tell us anything about how Einstein 
came up with his formula. It is possible he discovered it entirely by accident. This 
would not change the formula’s value, but it would be more difficult to claim that 
Einstein was creative in his discovery.  
Next, we will look at the creative process. Normally, being creative is often 
considered the opposite of being mechanical, so calling any mechanical process 
“creative” seems to violate this core intuition about creativity. However, creativity may 
be employed by mechanical means. An assembly line, for example, produces a car and 
many different people play a role in this production. Each person has a very specific 
repetitive task and the final product is a new car, surely valuable, and an artifact made 
by agents. To find the core sense of creativity, we have to look at the original designer 
who drafted the plans from scratch. The ‘artifact’ may be realized mechanically, but 
creativity is still present. In many cases, it is actually impossible to realize a creative 
idea without employing some kind of mechanical process. Simply evaluating the 
process could cause us to reject cases of creativity which can only be realized by 
mechanical means. To understand the core, intuitive sense of creativity, we have to see 
how the idea was itself generated. 
Subjective creativity emphasizes the agent and how their ideas come into being. 
This distinction is important to the overarching discussion about computers and their 
products. Presently, we have creative artifacts made by computers, which even employ 
a process that replicates the psychological mechanisms of human creativity. Margaret 
Boden calls these results “apparent” creativity, distinguishing them from “genuine” 
creativity, the kind exhibited by human beings (Boden 2014, 225-6). Boden shows how 
creative psychological processes could be instantiated in computers, by distinguishing 
between three types of creativity that emerge from different psychological 
mechanisms: combinatorial (the juxtaposition of diverse ideas), exploratory (novel 
structures informed and limited by their defining constraints) and transformational, 
or “radical creativity”, which explores the conceptual space and rejects aspects of the 
framework in favor of a new paradigm (Boden 2014, 228). Computationally 
instantiating these processes lead to novel and valuable results without necessarily 
being “genuine”, whether that means involving conscious mental states or not. On one 
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hand, it could be claimed that whether they have mental states or not, computers can 
be creative, if they instantiate the relevant processes. But, on the other hand, we could 
dismiss computer creativity by asserting that no amount of computer creativity could 
ever produce something like Kant’s fine art and that being “genuine” in the core sense 
of creativity means a computer would have to ascend to the heights of Chopin or 
Shakespeare – something that we do not even require of human beings whom we call 
“creative”. We need to find a less demanding condition that separates apparent 
creativity from genuine creativity, or mere art from fine art. Kant says it is taste that 
“consists in disciplining (or training) genius” (Kant 1790/1987 §50, 188). Without 
taste, or judgment, all of the imagination’s “riches (in ideas) produce nothing but 
nonsense” (ibid.).  
  Art can be distinguished from fine art with the latter exhibiting the productive 
capacity of genius shaped by judgments of taste. Psychological mechanisms for 
creativity can be instantiated into computers which, by virtue of their design can 
exhibit the necessary skills, producing the content of genius; however, judgments of 
taste might be out of bounds for computers, because they would require subjective 
experience. If so, then computers would lack the capacity for “genuine” creativity. But 
this claim only holds if: (a) taste is necessary for creativity and necessarily conscious, 
and (b) computers cannot be conscious.  
In the next two sections, I clarify the conditions of novelty and value.  
 
2.3 Understanding the novelty condition of creativity  
 
In the last section, the importance of looking to the subjective experience of creativity 
was emphasized. In connection with this, Margaret Boden puts forward a relevant 
clarification regarding novelty. She distinguishes between “psychological” and 
“historical” creativity (Boden 2010, 30-31). P-creativity (psychological) refers to a 
creative idea that is new to the person creating it. H-creativity (historical) refers to an 
idea that no one (in history) has ever had before.  
This is important to distinguish because, in the case of someone being P-
creative, they are still being creative even if it turns out that their creative idea already 
exists in the world. Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace are a classic example of 
this, since both put forward a theory of evolution through natural selection almost 
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simultaneously without having had access to each other’s work. It would seem that 
novelty implies a kind of newness which (taken too strictly) would invalidate the 
creativity of someone – either Darwin or Wallace – based on who published first. But 
this is contrary to our intuitions about creativity. And this is why P-creativity is a 
necessary condition for creativity. Anything that is H-creative will also be P-creative. 
H-creativity is the concern of objective creativity, and so I will not be considering it in 
depth in this thesis.  
Novelty can be trivial. In the broadest sense of anthropological, or cultural 
novelty, culturally new ideas, patterns and behavior transmitted through generations 
count as “novel”. “In this anthropological sense, creativity is a conditio humana and a 
ubiquitous activity” (Kronfeldner 2009, 579). In this most basic sense, creativity is a 
natural part of being (this even echoes Boden’s claim that creativity is a basic feature 
of human intelligence). These everyday acts represent a subjective, yet banal 
creativity: a creativity that is ordinary. Robert Weisberg gives philosophical support to 
the idea that novelty is the norm of all behavior, “because we are continually adapting 
our behavior to fit new circumstances” (Weisberg 1993, 11). It is normal to produce 
objects or ideas of minimal value that are novel, such as a salad for dinner, or precisely 
the way in which I walk to school. The ubiquity of (trivial) novelty – that it might even 
be impossible not to be novel – puts all the onus for distinguishing creative actions 
from other actions on value.  
One way to resolve this issue might be by considering one final variety of novelty 
that Kronfeldner describes, namely metaphysical novelty. If the universe is a 
naturalist, determinist kind, the only kind of novelty that could then be genuine would 
have to come to the mind of the creator independent of any causal determination. On 
the deterministic view, all novelty is fundamentally reducible to antecedent pre-
conditions. Some philosophers argue that genuine creativity must feature creatio ex 
nihilo (creativity out of nothing), otherwise any newness would simply be the 
consequent of antecedent conditions (Hausman & Rothenberg 1976, 3-26). In a 
naturalist universe, metaphysical novelty is impossible because the natural world is all 
there is; in a determinist universe, metaphysical novelty would be the only genuine 
novelty because any novelty that did not come from a metaphysical realm would have 
to have been predetermined. This is also known as the paradox of creativity: “genuine 
creativity is either unexplainable or not present” (Kronfeldner 2009, 582). I think we 
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can safely assume a naturalist universe, and so explanations for novelty should 
conform to the naturalist paradigm. If anthropological novelty is too broad a category 
and trivializes novelty, then metaphysical novelty is too strict and makes genuine 
novelty near impossible to obtain.  
This discussion of novelty seems to place a much heavier burden on the role of 
value in creativity. In this next section I will consider Alison Hills’ and Alexander Bird’s 
argument that it is possible to be creative and not create anything of value. Their 
definition of creativity “would reject value but retain originality” (Hills & Bird 2018, 
95). This will be difficult to resolve with the emphasis I have placed on value. To 
redeem novelty from triviality, we continue to value psychological novelty (newness to 
the creator) of a certain kind and may need to adjust the standard view to 
accommodate the argument for creativity without value. 
 
2.4 Understanding the value condition 
 
Allison Hills and Alexander Bird argue that it is possible to be creative without 
producing objects of value. In their view, creativity includes novelty (originality), 
imagination, fertility and motivation, but not value. In this section, I will address their 
argument against value. In the previous section, I discussed the ubiquity of novelty 
and its trivialness as simply a natural part of behavior. On this account, the role of 
value was emphasized. It would be fatal to the standard view if novelty were treated as 
inseparable from ordinary behavior and value had no role. Hills and Bird’s argument 
against the value condition may prove difficult to reconcile with the importance of the 
value condition for addressing the problem with the triviality of novelty. But it is 
possible that we can adjust the standard view to accommodate their argument in a way 
that keeps both novelty and value in the definition of creativity. 
Hills and Bird’s main definition of creativity is that it is the “disposition or set 
of linked dispositions of an individual: to have many ideas (fertility); which are novel 
(originality) and generated through use of the imagination (imagination); and to carry 
through these ideas to completion (motivation)” (Hills & Bird, 2018, 95). Their 
definition lacks a value requirement. If creativity requires value, it should be 
impossible to be creative and produce objects with no value.  
17 
 
There are many ways in which value can be obtained in a creative act. An idea 
or artifact can: (1) have objective value; (2) be good of its kind; or (3) be good for the 
creator (Hills & Bird 2018, 96-97). The core sense of “creativity” still counts as 
“creative” cases which can be shown to meet none of the above conditions of value. In 
other words, even when value cannot be found, we intuitively think creativity has 
happened. Without introducing supplemental conditions, is there any way to 
accommodate such cases and keep the value condition?  
We can look at Hills and Bird’s case of the failed torturer. Torture instruments, 
in general, have no objective value (ex. 1); and this particular torture instrument is a 
failed variation of ‘the rack’, e.g. “it causes death too quickly, without enough suffering” 
(ibid., 98) and so is not even good ‘of its kind’ (ex. 2); finally, producing torture 
instruments makes the torturer miserable (ex. 3). Do we still consider the torturer 
creative? If yes, how can this be if there is no value to be found anywhere in the above 
case?  
Given Hills and Bird’s reasoning, I believe that the standard view could be 
tweaked in a way that still includes a value condition. According to the modified 
standard view, being creative always aims at producing something that is valuable. 
Thus, creativity involves an agent aiming to increase their idea of value. An objection 
here would be that someone could be forced to create a torture instrument, even 
though they are against torture. In that scenario, their actual goal is to make the most 
dysfunctional torture instrument. That is the context in which they are aiming at value. 
Instead, if their life depends on making the ‘best’ torture instrument, they will aim at 
that value if they value their life more. Assuming the torturer is not aiming to fail at 
making torture devices, he is still being creative. ‘Aiming’ points to an attempt at value. 
I think it is fair to state that no one who we consider creative aims to produce ideas or 
artifacts of unvalue. Rather they aim at value, and succeed or fail. But success or failure 
of an act should not invalidate the creativity.   
Another objection to my claim might be that ‘aiming at value’ is not the same 
as actually having value. I think this is the principal distinction between subjective and 
objective creativity. Subjective creativity aims at value; objective creativity succeeds. I 
think this is partially addressed by Hills and Bird’s argument that the creative 
disposition is manifestly the same, regardless of the outcome. So, one is creative even 
if what one produces has no value. And one is not being creative if one aims at unvalue.  
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The torturer’s aim is certainly to create something of value in the context of torture 
instruments. He succeeds or fails, but his creativity aims at value, regardless.  
Hills and Bird could be read as echoing this claim when they acknowledge that 
success or failure of creativity does not signal two different dispositions: “one to 
imaginatively produce things of value; one to imaginatively produce worthless things” 
(ibid 97). The same disposition aims at value and subjective creativity should not be 
measured by success or failure in an objective sense. This is also why Hills and Bird 
put forth imagination as their most important supplemental characteristic of 
creativity. Imagination does not guarantee success, but the more vivid one’s 
imagination, the more likely one is to produce highly creative artifacts.   
In this chapter, I have discussed the standard view of creativity in philosophy 
which is that creativity is the ability to produce novel and valuable artifacts. Highly 
valuable products and artifacts exist which come about through mechanical means or 
luck, both of which are considered incompatible with the core sense of creativity. A 
deeper, more intuitive sense of creativity looks to the psychological processes of the 
agent. With novelty, there is a trivial novelty which human behavior in everyday 
circumstances automatically produces. This places more of an emphasis on the value 
condition. However, Hills and Bird have argued that it is possible to be creative 
without producing anything of value. To salvage the value condition, a modified 







3. CREATIVITY REQUIRES CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Artists have a vested interest in our believing in the flash of revelation, the so-called 
inspiration... shining down from heavens as a ray of grace. In reality, the imagination of the 
good artist or thinker produces continuously good, mediocre or bad things, but his judgment, 
trained and sharpened to a fine point, rejects, selects, connects... All great artists and thinkers 
are great workers, indefatigable not only in inventing, but also in rejecting, sifting, 
transforming, ordering. (Nietzsche 1878, quoted in Popova 2012) 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I gave a working definition of creativity. The standard view of 
creativity is that it is the ability to produce novel and valuable artifacts or ideas. Issues 
with novelty and value were discussed. Given my motivation for asking if computers 
can be creative (namely, that computers might become “creative” in the sense in which 
human creativity is valuable and meaning-giving), it makes sense to focus on P-
creativity, or psychological novelty. In P-creativity, an idea is new to the originator.  
This chapter focuses on the first premise of the consciousness argument: that 
creativity requires consciousness. Once we adopt the view of creativity as a subjective 
phenomenon (“subjective creativity”), outlined above, it seems that the subjective 
experience of consciousness may play an inescapable role in creativity in connection 
with taste (the selection phase). Taste was thought to explain the distinction between 
art and fine art, according to Kant, and here it can be thought to distinguish ‘apparent’ 
from ‘genuine’ creativity of computers (Boden 2014, 225-6). However, it was also 
pointed out that creativity cannot simply consist in having taste, for then any art critic 
would be an artist. Even if taste were necessarily conscious, it is not clear that taste is 
necessary for creativity. Section 3.1 will look at the experience of taste through Bence 
Nanay’s experiential account, followed by a brief view of “phenomenal consciousness” 
according to Thomas Nagel. Doing this will show what an experience of taste must 
consist in, namely there is something it is like to experience something as not thought 
to be possible before.  
It is also not clear what role consciousness plays in the generation (production) 
phase of creativity. To address that issue, I will look at the role of imagination and how 
two views of creativity – passive and active – have implications for the role of 
consciousness in creativity (3.2, 3.3). Finally, I will discuss four conditions that a 
creative action must supposedly exhibit. Berys Gaut calls these conditions collectively 
“flair”. They include purposefulness, understanding, judgment and evaluative ability 
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(3.4). I will ask if these conditions are necessary to creativity and whether or not they 
require consciousness. Considering Gaut’s view will help with assessing the claim that 
creativity requires consciousness. 
 
3.1 The ‘what-it-is-likeness’ of subjective experience  
 
The distinction between subjective and objective creativity relates to the question of 
what the explanatorily basic notion of creativity is. In the last chapter, I defended 
focusing on creativity as essentially a mental process; therefore, to better understand 
it, we must look to the mind of the creator. This section will assess the subjective 
experience of creativity to determine its necessary components. 
 
3.1.1 The experiential account 
Bence Nanay claims that a mental process is creative “if and only if it produces an idea 
that is veridically experienced as something we have not thought to be possible before 
and as something we have not learned from someone else” (Nanay 2014, 24). This 
experiential account of Nanay’s helps to explain what creativity requires, beyond 
trivial novelty, by distinguishing subjectively creative actions from the trivially novel 
ones. According to this account, I am being P-creative when I experience my idea as 
something I have not thought possible before. The problem that novelty could be 
trivial (e.g. a new salad) disappears under Nanay’s account, because I will not 
experience the salad as something I have not thought to be possible before. Can 
computers be creative on this account? Yes, if they can have (the relevant) experiences.  
Presently, it seems that computers lack experiences. One of the issues with this 
claim is that there might be no way to know objectively what a specific experience is 
like (if you are not the one having it), or whether computers are having experiences at 
all. One might say that experience has a subjective character and there is no objectivity 
of experience. From the outside, one can understand the physics of something like 
lightning, but there is no way to explain the experience of lightning in physical terms. 
And the further we go into the physicalist account of what lightning is, the further away 
we get from the subjective experience of lightning.  
What constitutes a conscious experience? Nagel says that “the fact that an 
organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is 
like to be that organism” (Nagel 1974, 436). The subjective character of experience is 
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not analyzable in terms of “any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional 
states” (ibid.) since “any shift from a specific point of view to one of greater objectivity 
takes us farther away from the real nature of the phenomenon: our specific viewpoint” 
(Nagel 1974, 445).  
Conscious experiences have a distinctive feel; there is therefore something it is 
like to have a conscious experience, but not all experiences might be conscious. Peter 
Carruthers, for example, recognizes that there are nonconscious experiences: “What 
does it feel like to be the subject of a nonconscious experience? It feels like nothing” 
(Carruthers 1989, 506). If we experience an idea as something we have not thought to 
be possible before, however, there is something it is like to have that experience, and 
that experience is a conscious experience. This means if Nanay’s experiential account 
adequately captures subjective creativity, then subjective creativity requires 
consciousness.  
Is Nanay’s condition actually necessary for creativity, however? I do not think 
so. On his account, it would be impossible to be creative without “experiencing an idea 
as something not thought to be possible before” (Nanay 2014, 24). New ideas are 
always technically experienced as something not thought to be possible before, even 
uncreative or nonsensical ideas.  
Additionally, creative ideas may be generated without any conscious 
experience. There are minimal accounts of agency which grant agency to human and 
non-human agents without the ascription of mental representations. One example is 
skilled coping, which is “the ability to engage with others and with one’s circumstances 
by responding to the demands of the situation in a skillful and often effortless manner, 
without conscious deliberation, reasoning, or planning” (Schlosser 2015). Examples of 
skilled coping include improvisation, such as jazz playing or constructing sentences in 
conversation. Minimal views of agency allow for these kinds of habitual actions to 
qualify as agency, although they do not involve conscious deliberation. Peter 
Carruthers argues that there is nothing it is like to experience habitual actions (they 
are nonconscious experiences) and his examples of habitual actions include driving a 
car and doing the dishes (Carruthers 1989, 505).  
It seems counterintuitive to claim that there is nothing it is like to improvise in 
jazz, for jazz improvisation should be peak creativity. There is also some empirical 
evidence that instead shows that skilled coping may actually require consciousness. 
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This is important because until now, I have only suggested that taste (what one likes) 
is the necessary conscious experience in creativity.  On Nanay’s experiential account 
of creativity, combined with Nagel’s idea of phenomenal consciousness as the relevant 
kind of experience, taste occurs after-the-fact of productive creativity (generation). 
Generation, however, does not seem to necessitate a role for consciousness. The role 
of consciousness in generation is challenged by claims that improvisation, as habitual 
action, does not require conscious deliberation, and therefore there is nothing it is like 
to improvise jazz. In the next section, I will look at the jazz experiment to see if there 
is any evidence for this claim.  
 
3.1.2 The jazz experiment 
Recent psychological experiments seem to confirm the major role that consciousness 
plays in the generation of creative ideas. Baumeister, et al., ran a series of experiments 
to test the role of consciousness in creativity (Baumeister et al. 2016). This section will 
look at one such experiment which involved musical improvisation of jazz guitar under 
a cognitive load. The idea was to burden the conscious mind with the task of counting 
backwards in sixes from the number 913 and simultaneously improvise a guitar solo 
over accompaniment. This test was based on the assumption that “the conscious mind 
can only do one thing at a time” (ibid., 188) and so occupying the conscious mind with 
counting backwards would free up the unconscious mind to be creative. The 
experiment challenges the common belief that “creativity flourishes when unconscious 
processes are permitted to flow and blossom undisturbed by conscious interference” 
(ibid., 186). The musicians themselves were under the impression that their playing 
would be better because “the conscious ego would be out of the way and the creative 
unconscious would be able to operate unfettered” (ibid., 191).  
Contrary to the expectations of the musicians, the actual creativity of their 
playing suffered. It was shown that the improvised melodies “tended toward repetition 
and simple, stilted phrases” (ibid.). What is not clear is whether conscious generation 
or conscious selection was affected by this experiment. The unconscious seems to be 
the seat of the spontaneous generation of ideas, but unlike the conscious mind, does 
not get bored with its solutions to problems. “Boredom may be a conscious feeling, 
something largely alien to the unconscious” (ibid., 192). The authors concluded that 
“only with full conscious awareness does the mind reject repetition and continue to 
exchange different patterns until a fully, pleasingly creative result is obtained” (ibid.).  
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This experiment aimed to establish whether or not there is a clear role for 
consciousness in creativity. Although the experiment seems to show that 
consciousness is necessary, it is not evident in what capacity. If creativity stems from 
the unconscious, then perhaps the imagination is necessary for expression.  
 
3.2 The role of imagination in creativity 
 
This section looks at the role of imagination in creativity. If one is being actively 
creative, ideas are entertained in the imagination where they can be freely explored 
through conscious deliberation. Creative ideas can appear as a product of 
improvisation, but improvisation may not appear as “something which one has not 
thought to be possible before” or even with phenomenal characteristics. The inability 
to apply one’s taste might explain why creativity is hampered in improvisation with 
inhibited consciousness, but the above experiment concentrated on the generation 
component of creativity, not the selection component.  This section will delve deeper 
into the role of imagination in active creativity and ask if imagination is necessary for 
creativity.  
What is the core sense of imagination, then? Berys Gaut claims that  
 
imagining that such and such is the case, imagining that p, is a matter of entertaining the 
proposition that p. Entertaining a proposition is a matter of having it in mind, where having it 
in mind is a matter of thinking of it in such a way that one is not committed to the proposition’s 
truth, or indeed to its falsity (Gaut 2003, 152). 
 
Gaut discusses other uses of ‘imagination’ but contends that the core sense of 
imagination relates to entertaining a proposition without committing to its truth or 
falsity. Unlike other mental states such as belief and intention, imagination lacks any 
intrinsic end at all, thus it “exhibits a kind of freedom” (ibid., 160) making it “suited of 
its nature - to be the vehicle for active creativity” (ibid.). Active creativity seems to 
necessitate a conscious role - that of active imagination - for creative acts.  
Gaut makes a distinction between imagination as a source of creativity, and as 
a vehicle for creativity. When Kasparov played Deep Blue, both the human and the 
computer used their imagination. Deep Blue has, in a sense, a powerful imagination 
in that it can “survey vastly more possible positions than any human could” (ibid., 
158). Gaut argues that Kasparov used his imagination creatively. Kasparov imagines 
different moves he could make, but it does not follow that his imagination “is the 
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source of that creativity” (159). Instead, Gaut argues that his creativity is displayed in 
“how he uses his imagination, but that in turn is explained largely by factors such as 
his vast experience, considerable knowledge of chess history, practiced technique and 
sheer native talent” (159).  
So what is the source of creativity? “Our own experience provides the basic 
material for our imagination” (Nagel 1974, 439). While this is true with Kasparov, it is 
also true with Deep Blue whose “experience” is the rich history of chess books and 
previous games it was given that it later utilized when conducting its strategy. Though 
the imagination might be perfectly suited to entertain various propositions, the 
imagination is not necessary for creativity. For example, Bertrand Russell, when 
writing Principia Mathematica, would work on a problem, then fall asleep and awake 
the next morning with the solution (Gaut 2003 155). Many creative acts happen 
without using our imagination and not every use of the imagination results in a 
creative act.  
 
3.3 The passive view of creativity  
 
There is a set of views on creativity that Gaut collectively calls the “passive view” (Gaut 
2003, 150). What these views all share is the idea that the creative act originates from 
outside the conscious mind of the creator. It could be the case that creativity requires 
both active and passive mental processes. However, if it turns out that genuine cases 
of creativity exist without any involvement of consciousness, then the first premise of 
the main argument of this thesis is defeated, and the argument fails. If any of the 
processes described in the passive views could result in creativity without conscious 
intervention by the agent, then creativity would not require consciousness. So far, I 
have considered whether imagination and taste might be conscious elements that are 
necessary for creativity. (Taste and imagination are a coupling analogous to generation 
and selection.) Taste, I have argued, seems inseparable from the core, relevant sense 
of creativity, but there are problems with this which I will attend to later. Imagination 
was discussed in the last section and I found that it is not necessary for creativity. The 
question to keep in mind when looking at the passive view is whether or not novel and 




3.3.1 Traditional passive views 
For a historical account of the passive view, we can start with the ancient Greeks who 
believed that creativity was the work of divine inspiration or divine madness. “Homer 
begins the Iliad by invoking the goddess to sing his story” (Blackburn 2014, 147). Plato, 
in Ion writes: “...there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of 
his senses…” (ibid). Even Shakespeare also wrote about divine madness, “comparing 
the poet’s frenzy to that of the lunatic and the lover” (Gaut 2003, 148). This way of 
thinking about creativity continues into contemporary writers as well. We can see the 
nod to the divine essence in an excerpt from Bukowski’s poem “So you want to be a 
writer?”:  
 
 when it is truly time, 
 and if you have been chosen,  
 it will do it by itself  
 and it will keep on doing it 
 until you die or it dies in you.  
 there is no other way. 
 and there never was. (Bukowski 2003). 
   
And these cases are not limited to the arts, the sciences have their own cases of the 
passive view. Friedrich von Kekulé’s discovery of the closed loop structure of the 
benzene molecule is portrayed by Kekulé himself here: 
 
I turned my chair to the fire and dozed… Again the atoms were gamboling before my eyes. This 
time the smaller groups kept modestly in the background. My mental eye, rendered more acute 
by repeated visions of this kind, could now distinguish larger structures, of manifold 
conformation; long rows, sometimes more closely fitted together; all twining and twisting in 
snake-like motion. But look! What was that? One of the snakes had seized hold of its own tail, 
and the form whirled mockingly before my eyes. As if by a flash of lightning I awoke. 
(Kronfeldner 2009, 587). 
 
Simon Blackburn talks about the moment of sudden illumination encapsulated in the 
‘flash of lightning’, or the ‘stroke of genius’ or Archimedes’ famous outburst of 
discovery: “Eureka!” (Blackburn 2014, 151).  
 It may have been Kant who reframed the traditional views of creativity and put 
the more modern emphasis on the imagination, but, even for Kant, there lingered 
behind a great mystery that fine art was so enchanting that surely it could not have 
come from a man. Kant grants the genius a quality that cannot be learned or taught, 
and cannot even be communicated “but must be conferred directly on each person by 
the hand of nature” (Kant 1790/1987, §47, 177).  
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It is not clear what role consciousness plays in the passive view. In none of these 
cases can we outright claim that consciousness plays no role in creativity, but it is not 
difficult to imagine that these cases require almost no active conscious deliberation. 
The passive views signal that “the conscious self of the artist was not the source of the 
creative work but rather received it as a gift” (Baumeister et al 2014, 186).  
A problem with these passive views is this. If the artist or scientist was the 
conscious recipient of the “gift” of creative work, would they still be praiseworthy in 
any meaningful sense? A part of the core sense of “creativity” that is relevant here is 
that creative agents are responsible for their creations. It is no help to call someone 
“creative” if all that it means is they have received a gift. However, if we discard the 
traditional inspiration and madness views of creativity in history and the genius view 
of Kant, how could we explain the origin of creative ideas? There may still be some 
understanding to be gained by exploring the role of the unconscious in creativity. In 
the next section, I will look at Sigmund Freud’s view that “creative success may depend 
on deep unconscious processes and even defense mechanisms such as sublimation” 
(Baumeister et al. 2014, 186). I will also look at contemporary literature on 
unconscious cognition. 
 
3.3.2 Freud’s psychodynamic theory 
Freud tried to apply his psychodynamic theory to creativity via psychobiography, 
which retrospectively analyzed creative works to explain them under the view that 
“creative thinking was dominated by primary-process thinking – irrational and 
primitive and associated with the id and the unconscious – rather than by secondary 
process thinking – logical and realistic and associated with the conscious ego” 
(Weisberg 1993, 29). Human instincts form the id, a primary process which is only 
concerned with survival and achieving pleasure. Images are formed in the mind to 
satisfy instinctual needs, but not every need can be satisfied. Thus, the ego uses the 
secondary process to “satisfy needs through logical thinking and problem solving” 
(ibid). The ego and id are in conflict and the ego dominates the id forcing id 
expressions into the unconscious. Those id expressions manifest when the ego is 
temporarily weakened, such as while dreaming, day-dreaming or on drugs. Primary 
process expressions are dependent on unconscious material and appear irrational or 
bizarre, but there is also an idea that there is an internal conceptual logic to them based 
on their connection to primitive drives. Besides the uniqueness of the unconscious 
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conceptual logic and its bizarre expressions, there is a further aid to creativity here, 
which is that through art, a creative individual can express these repressed instinctual 
needs.  
Psychobiographies were analyses of great works through a Freudian lens, but 
they have since been debunked. For example, Freud treated Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona 
Lisa’s enigmatic smile as da Vinci’s repressed “emotions towards his unknown 
mother” (ibid., 30) in that the particular model aroused those feelings. But more 
recent studies show that even earlier works of da Vinci’s feature women possessing the 
same enigmatic smile (ibid., 36), suggesting the smile was more a feature of da Vinci’s 
style than anything particular about the model in Mona Lisa. Psychobiographies 
unsuccessfully attempted to apply Freudian psychoanalysis to art, but Freudian 
psychology of the role of the unconscious in cognitive acts is still very relevant today. 
Analyzing the role of the unconscious in cognitive acts is a question of whether 
or not people choose, through acts of will, their various actions and behaviors or if 
these actions and behaviors come from environmental cues or internal unconscious 
forces. Freud considered actions and behaviors products of unconscious primal urges. 
This section mainly looked at the history of the passive view, according to which 
creative acts ‘happen’ to agents. Even if the agents are consciously aware of their “gift,” 
this does not imply that they deserve credit for their creativity. Today most people 
would not accept the divine or the hand of nature as explaining the genesis of creative 
ideas. But creativity could still be understood in somewhat similar terms. For example, 
Bargh & Chartrand point out that “the mainstream of psychology accepts both the fact 
of conscious or willed causation of mental and behavioral processes and the fact of 
automatic or environmentally triggered processes” (Bargh & Chartrand 1999, 463).  
3.3.3 Bargh & Chartrand’s view 
For Bargh and Chartrand, conscious processes are “mental acts of which we are aware, 
that we intend, that require effort, and that we can control if we choose” (ibid.). Certain 
mental skills require an act of will to initiate them. The more you develop a skill like 
improvising jazz, the more automatic that experience becomes when you initiate it into 
action. This explains why improvisation can appear as ‘skilled coping’ (or habitual 
action) and still be hampered under a light cognitive load. The ability of jazz 
improvisation is partly conscious and partly unconscious ability. Aspects of it remain 
under conscious control, while other aspects have been handed off to the unconscious.  
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The interesting thing about Bargh and Chartrand’s research is that they show 
how goals and evaluations can be automatic and even primed. In these cases, the will 
is bypassed altogether. “The goal, once activated, should operate to produce the same 
effects as if it had been consciously chosen” (ibid., 469). This goal automaticity relates 
to previous motivations, which basically means the conscious mind has created the 
pattern of behavior that the unconscious picks up on and eventually takes over. A 
similar process happens with evaluations as well. 
 
A substantial body of evidence has now accumulated that one’s evaluations often (if not usually) 
become activated directly, without one needing to think about them, or even be aware that one 
has just classified the person or event as good or bad (ibid., 474). 
 
Evaluations of events or objects eventually become properties of their perceptual 
representation. We may be evaluating without consciously intending to evaluate. What 
is especially relevant for the core sense of creativity is how vital the evaluative 
component in creativity (judgments of taste) has been thus far in seeking a role for 
consciousness in creativity. It may be the case, however, that when encountering novel 
artifacts “what we thinking we are doing while consciously deliberating in actuality has 
no effect on the outcome of the judgment” (ibid.). 
 Bargh and Chartrand’s research de-emphasizes the role of purposefulness and 
evaluative ability as conscious elements in creativity. These conditions along with 
understanding and judgment are necessary conditions that creative actions must 
exhibit, according to Berys Gaut. In the final section of this chapter, I will look at Gaut’s 
agency view and ask if each condition he gives is necessary for creativity and if 
consciousness is necessary for each condition.  
 
3.4 Berys Gaut’s agency conception of creativity by flair 
 
There may be another way to answer definitively whether or not consciousness is a 
necessary component of creativity. To do this, I will examine Gaut’s agency conception 
of creativity by “flair”, which expands on the standard view. Gaut claims that creativity 
is a property of agents, and that specific agents’ actions count as creative. Gaut 
introduces the concept of “flair”, a term which sums up the conditions he gives for the 
agent’s action that is to count as creative. The kind of actions that are creative are “ones 
that exhibit at least a relevant purpose, some degree of understanding or skill, a degree 
of judgment and an evaluative ability directed to the task at hand” (Gaut 2010, 1040). 
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Therefore, according to Gaut, creativity is “the capacity to produce original and 
valuable items by flair” (ibid 1041). I will look at each of the conditions and then ask 
whether or not consciousness is a necessary feature of each one. 
  
3.4.1 Creative actions must exhibit purposefulness 
If we accept the minimal accounts of agency, then all creatures act with a purpose (the 
fundamental purpose ‘to be’). However, is purposefulness in some more demanding 
sense necessary for creative acts? Purposefulness in creativity relates to a certain 
intentional state and this presupposes a mental state. As the last section illustrated, 
not all mental states are conscious, however; so purposefulness may not require 
consciousness, even if it requires a mental state. 
To show the importance of purposefulness, Gaut draws the contrast between a 
putative creative object made purely by chance versus one made intentionally. He 
claims that how something is made “plays an essential role in determining whether 
the act of making it is creative” (Gaut 2003, 150-1). We do not classify something made 
purely by luck as creative. For example, suppose that I drop my guitar down a flight of 
steps and on the way down the guitar strikes each step producing a single note each 
time; when it finally lands, the successive notes are a melody I find beautiful. Have I 
been creative? Gaut would say that this was pure luck. In order for my creation to count 
as creative, it must have been my conscious intention to produce a melody.  
 However, if I flip a paintbrush on a canvas and I like what I see, then although 
I did not intend exactly what happened, I can still be considered creative. Berys Gaut 
says that “this follows the reasoning that actions are ‘intentional under some 
description’” (Gaut 2018, 130)  
 
It is not part of my case that to be creative an artist must intend to produce all of the artistic 
values that her work exemplifies. That would entail that if an artist were not aware of a 
particular value of her work, say the intensity of the interaction between two colors in a 
paintings background, we could not give her creative credit. That is too strong a requirement 
(Gaut 2018, 130). 
 
Let us grant, then, that purposefulness is necessary for creativity. But is consciousness 
necessary for purposefulness? In the last section, Bargh and Chartrand pointed to 
cases where goals could be primed by the environment or even habituated by repeated 
motivations. In these cases, it would seem that consciousness is not necessary for 




3.4.2 Creative actions exhibit a degree of understanding or skill 
Gaut also says that we must rule out cases of creativity in which the product came 
about by a mechanical procedure. This is because any creative solution that is realized 
mechanically shows no degree of understanding or skill. Gaut gives the example of 
Charles Goodyear’s discovery of vulcanization (Gaut 2010, 1041). The theory of 
vulcanization is considered a highly original and valuable scientific discovery, but 
Goodyear’s discovery is not considered a creative act because of the manner in which 
he made his discovery. Goodyear apparently dropped substances into liquid rubber 
until he found something that caused a reaction - sulfur. This example shows that he 
lacked an understanding of what he was doing, and therefore he was not creative. The 
discovery is a case of good luck since he simply could have continued dropping 
substances in liquid rubber until he got a reaction.  
Is having an understanding of what you are doing necessary for creativity? In 
the cases of math and sciences, perhaps, because otherwise one simply relies on luck 
for their achievements. One could solve a math problem simply guessing, for example. 
In the arts and other cases, it is harder to say and I think it depends on how strict the 
degree of understanding is. For example, it is not obvious to me when I sing that I 
understand exactly what I am doing. Mostly, my singing comes naturally and the 
aspects which I utilize (opening my mouth and pushing out “sound” are not so clear). 
It could also be argued that animal behavior, such as the erratic flight patterns of bats, 
constitute understanding (knowing how avoiding predators), but it is not clear the 
degree that the understanding takes. It may be a reaction, much like ‘skilled coping’, 
which contains no conscious experience. It may be odd to say that the bat “knows” 
what it is doing, but it seems more odd to say “it has no idea” what to do in relation to 
predators.  
 
3.4.3 Creative actions must exhibit a degree of judgment 
In order to motivate the third “flair” condition, Gaut gives the example of someone 
who produces a painting simply by following a rule, such as paint-by-numbers (Gaut 
2010, 1041). Doing this leaves no room for individual judgment, therefore this action 
is not creative. 
Do creative actions exhibit a degree of judgment? Yes: exercising judgment is 
necessary for your work to be your work, in the relevant sense, rather than somebody 
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else’s work. And the work must be your work, in order to be your creative work. The 
relevant sense of “creativity” includes a certain kind of relationship between the 
creator and their artifact. Because of these relationships, creators are praised for their 
creative achievements. As Harry Deutsch says of the paint-by-numbers case “all the 
creative work has been done for them; and the same is true for the plagiarist” (Deutsch, 
1991, 211). However, is consciousness necessary for judgment? No, and this is again 
for the same reason: that there can be primes or environmental cues which activate 
your goals and evaluative abilities without you being consciously aware.  
3.4.4 Creative actions must exhibit an evaluative ability directed to the task at hand 
The example given in support of this condition is of a chimpanzee painting (Gaut 2010, 
1041). The chimpanzee adds paint until the trainer removes the painting at a time in 
which it is aesthetically pleasing. The issue is that the chimpanzee does not show an 
evaluative ability; the trainer does. Because chimpanzees have no evaluative ability, 
they will continue to add paint until the canvas is covered. Evaluative ability is 
essentially ‘taste’ (what one likes). The chimpanzee’s actions are not creative actions; 
they may be intentional actions, but they do not originate from an intention to create 
a painting as we understand it (though they originate from the intention to make a 
mess). 
 Is exhibiting an evaluative ability directed to the task at hand necessary for 
creativity? I do think that evaluative ability is a necessary condition of creativity. If one 
cannot evaluate their work, then creativity has not taken place. Even if the 
determination of evaluation is that the work is bad, one is making an evaluative 
judgment on whether or not the work meets their evaluative standard. Without this 
ability, the actions one is doing do not seem to be creative actions.  
 Is consciousness necessary for evaluative ability? No, for two reasons.  The first 
is the same reason as the reason in the case of judgment: unconscious primes and 
environmental cues can trigger ‘good’ or ‘bad’ judgments even when one is consciously 
thinking otherwise (Bargh & Chartrand 1999). The second reason is that a thermostat 
can be said to have an evaluative ability: it can perceive changes in the temperature of 
the room and adjust itself accordingly. Similarly, a computer can instantiate style, 
which is the functional equivalent of an evaluative ability. A style is “a general pattern 
of ideas/artifacts that is sustained over time by the people adopting it” (Boden 2014, 
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230). An example would be the sculptor William Latham’s genetic algorithm program 
which generates sustained visual styles (ibid).  
 This chapter has been analyzing the role of consciousness in creativity. As it 
stands, I cannot find any necessary role for consciousness in creativity. The 
praiseworthiness of creativity rules out passive views, according to which creativity is 
“gifted” by gods, madness or nature. The imagination is not necessary for creativity, as 
many examples of passive creativity show. I found that both purposefulness and 
evaluative ability could be primed and triggered by environmental cues, without 
conscious involvement. The role of taste is not entirely clear. Even the Surrealists, for 
example, found their “unconsciously generated artworks attracted their conscious 
approval once they had been formed” (Boden 2014, 235). However, taste is not a 
productive ability and as it was shown a computer can instantiate styles and moods, 
effectively simulating taste. The next chapter deals with John Searle’s position – that 
computer instantiation of taste is not really taste – and looks at some 





4. COMPUTERS CANNOT BE CONSCIOUS 
 
This chapter will assess the claim that computers cannot be conscious. I have argued 
above that creativity does not require consciousness, i.e. that the first premise of the 
master argument against computer creativity is false. If that is indeed the case, then 
the argument fails regardless of the status of the second premise. However, since the 
first premise was not quite conclusively refuted, it is worthwhile to take a look at the 
second premise as well, just in case the first premise can be vindicated, after all. 
In this chapter, I will look at John Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment 
and some of the debate surrounding it, such as the debate on whether or not the Turing 
Test functions as an effective measure of intelligence. Searle was addressing his 
argument against the claims of classical AI theorists, that an AI that simulates 
“understanding” would actually understand the way that humans understand. Given 
Searle’s position, a computer simulation of ‘taste’ is not really taste, and this perhaps 
could mean that a computer cannot be genuinely creative, because it lacks a necessary 
conscious element that is required for genuine creativity. I will also respond to the 
assumption that as a programmed artifact, a computer cannot be conscious, since one 
may use this view to defend the second premise of the master argument. Finally, I will 
present some objections to the second premise from Daniel Dennett and Hilary 
Putnam. 
 
4.1 Searle and the Chinese room 
 
Using the Chinese room thought experiment, John Searle argues that a machine could 
think only if it had “internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains” (Searle 1980, 
1). Searle is assuming that intentionality, or ‘aboutness,’ is a product of causal features 
of the brain. Searle’s argument looks like this: computer programs are syntactic formal 
systems; human minds are semantic (thoughts have meaning); “syntax by itself is 
neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics”; and therefore, “programs are 
neither constitutive of nor sufficient for human minds” (Churchland and Churchland 
1990, 33). The question of going from syntax to semantics is what is at stake in Searle’s 
paper. Computers run programs to simulate thought, but programs are not ‘thinking’. 
They simulate thinking, but that does not constitute real thinking, real understanding. 
34 
 
To illustrate this point, Searle imagines a monolingual English speaker in a 
room. In the room, and written in English, is a rulebook for outputting a string of 
Chinese symbols in response to different Chinese symbols. Into the room comes one 
set of symbols and out goes another. The English speaker is providing adequate 
responses to the outsiders’ questions, but at no point does the English speaker 
“understand” Chinese. However, for those outside the room, it looks like the operator 
in the room understands Chinese.  
It is obvious, according to Searle, that the man in the Chinese room does not 
understand Chinese. This is also what both Searle and Paul and Patricia Churchland 
object to about the Turing Test, in general. The Turing Test is a very demanding 
behavioral test for intelligence, or thinking, in which a machine engages in 
conversation with a human and passes the test if it convinces the human they are 
talking to another person. The Chinese room thought experiment is supposed to 
provide a counter-example to the Turing test: a system that passes the test, but clearly 
does not think (because it lacks understanding). 
 Searle’s Chinese room was an attempted refutation of the “strong AI” claims 
that certain symbol manipulating computer programs could be said to “understand” 
questions that they gave answers to. Searle had claimed that “syntax by itself is neither 
constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics” (ibid., 33) but to the Churchland’s, this 
was question-begging similar to the objections that “small particles by themselves 
could not constitute or be sufficient for the objective phenomenon of light” (ibid., 34) 
or that inanimate matter could constitute life. They state that Searle’s claim that rule-
governed symbol manipulation will never make up semantic phenomena is false. The 
question they deem important to ask regarding conscious computers is: what are the 
relevant causal powers for conscious intelligence? This is still an open question, but 
Searle and the Churchland’s both agree that the Turing Test is insufficient as a test for 
conscious intelligence on the grounds that “it is very important how the input-output 
function is achieved” (ibid., 37). Searle’s central point that is relevant for the current 
purposes is that a simulation of consciousness is not real consciousness. Mistaking a 
simulation of consciousness for real consciousness is troubling for many reasons. 
Humans might treat the simulated consciousness as real consciousness, which means 
caring for it, granting entities that simulate consciousness autonomy, rights or 
personal freedoms. On the other hand, that might not be a bad thing: treating entities 
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that simulate consciousness as if they had consciousness might be considered a 
practical and safe position. 
In the next section, I will discuss the Daniel Dennett’s view about the Turing 
Test. In contrast to Searle, he considers the Turing Test valuable. He also warns 
against the overestimation of cognitive powers in computers, especially as we become 
more and more reliant on computers for our daily lives. 
 
4.2 Daniel Dennett and the Turing Test 
 
Usually when we want to understand something, we reverse-engineer it. But it seems 
that this cannot be done with consciousness. Consciousness, as subjective experience, 
cannot be understood by any reductionist model of the brain; and no analysis of causal 
states and their function in the brain is complete without the subjective experience. 
Thomas Nagel says the reason for this “is that every subjective phenomenon is 
essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an 
objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view” (Nagel 1974, 437). The 
difficulty in emulating the brain is not just in understanding its architecture, then. For 
starters, repurposing artificial materials to do the same causal/functional work that 
the brain does would “dwarf the entire scientific and engineering resources of the 
planet for millennia” (Dennett 1994, sect.4). Additionally, no real understanding exists 
of why/how consciousness emerges in the first place. This is what David Chalmers calls 
the “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers 1995, sect. 2). Chalmers distinguishes 
the hard problems from the easy problems, with the latter being “reportability of 
mental states, ability of a system to access its own internal states, integration of 
information by a cognitive system” (ibid.), and so on. The aspects of consciousness 
mentioned in connection with the “easy problems” are, for the most part, already 
instantiated by computers.  
The difficulties with ascertaining whether computers can have consciousness 
make the Turing Test potentially valuable, because the test might be thought to 
provide a way of determining about a given computer whether it is conscious. In the 
Turing Test (Turing 1950), a human and a computer sit behind closed doors (much 
like the Chinese room). On the other side sits a judge who converses with both of them 
without seeing them. If the judge performs no better than chance in determining which 
interlocutor is human and which one is the computer, then the computer is said to 
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have passed the Turing Test. Turing “proposed that any computer that can regularly 
fool a discerning judge in this game would be intelligent - would be a computer that 
thinks - beyond any reasonable doubt” (Dennett 1985, 296). If one “can think in one’s 
own peculiar style well enough to imitate a thinking man or woman, one can think 
well, indeed” (ibid.) 
Dennett says Turing’s test was meant to get philosophers to agree on what 
thinking was, not necessarily as a perfect means to identify a thinking thing, let alone 
a conscious thing (there might be inhuman ways of being intelligent). The Turing test, 
when done correctly, means a computer must employ knowledge about the world, 
politics, society, etc. just to make sense of a sentence. Rules (syntax) of grammar or 
vocabulary will not guarantee the right understanding (semantics) of a passage or a 
question. “What fixes the right reading is knowledge about the world,” says Dennett 
(ibid., 299).  
Dennett concludes that the value of the Turing Test lies in the value of our 
theories on intelligence. “Verdicts on their intelligence or capacity for thought or 
consciousness would be only as informative and persuasive as the theories of 
intelligence or thought or consciousness the verdicts are based on” (Dennett 1985, 
310). The Turing Test is not perfect, but how can you test for the thing (consciousness) 
that is only revealed to the subject experiencing it? According to Dennett, over-valuing 
the cognitive powers of computers could create real social problems. So we need an 
appropriately hard test for computers’ cognitive powers; and the Turing Test is a good 
candidate. 
For current purposes, it is important that Dennett’s defense of the Turing Test 
motivates testing computers similarly for consciousness, not just 
intelligence/thinking. And although this is a hard test, it is one that computers can 
potentially pass. So it serves as a criticism of the second premise, that computers 
cannot be conscious. 
 
4.3 Further objections to the second premise 
 
Some argue that computer consciousness is a contradiction in terms because 
computers do what they are programmed to do and this is the antithesis of 
consciousness. In reality, computers implement a wide variety of programs running 
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‘algorithms’ (“sequence[s] of instructions telling a computer what to do” [Domingos 
2015, 1]) and not all algorithms strictly follow rules. Genetic algorithms, for example 
“can make random changes in the program’s own task-oriented rules” (Boden 2014, 
230) by following a path laid out by evolution i.e. interacting genes searching for 
maximum fitness. The fitness function is key to a genetic algorithm and it operates 
much like selective breeding where humans play the major role in determining the 
value of an item. Genetic algorithms also mimic sexual selection by creating parent 
hierarchies and then crossing over their information to create fitter generations (or 
fitter programs) (Domingos 2015, ch. 5). This elaborate process makes it impossible 
for the programmer to predict just what a computer will do. So the argument that 
computers cannot be conscious, since as programmed entities they just follow the 
rules put into them by the programmer, fails: programmed entities do not necessarily 
follow the rules envisioned by somebody else. 
In this last section of the chapter, I will consider some further objections to the 
claim that computers cannot be conscious. To start with, Dennett (1994) addresses a 
couple of reasons someone might give for why a conscious computer is impossible. The 
dualist position states simply that artificial beings like computers are material things 
and consciousness is immaterial mind-stuff. This idea borders on mysticism, 
according to Dennett. Thales, one of the pre-Socratics, thought the loadstone had a 
soul, and in his time that was the best proto-scientific understanding of magnetism. 
Consciousness is mysterious now, just like magnetism was in the past, but that does 
not mean there is not a natural physical explanation for it. History is filled with 
mysterious or miraculous phenomena which eventually became understood by 
science.  
A second way one might to object to the possibility of conscious computers has 
to do with the vitalist claim that consciousness is dependent on organic material. Since 
computers are inorganic, they cannot be conscious. This claim is species-centric and 
does not allow for inhuman or alien kinds of consciousness. It is most likely false 
(because it gives too narrow a conception of consciousness), but can still be defended 
on the grounds that to mechanistically reproduce all the powers of organic compounds 
in an alternate medium would require scales that border on the impossible. But even 
the complexity issue does not suffice to render the original claim unfalsifiable, for 
38 
 
there are plenty of complicated parts that can easily be substituted for simpler models, 
e.g. artificial heart valves.  
Hilary Putnam looks at similar arguments that all seem to share some baseline 
assumptions about computers, namely that they (computers, though he uses ‘robots’) 
are programmed artifacts, and anything that is a programmed artifact cannot be 
conscious (Putnam 1964, 680). I introduced this claim in the beginning of the section 
by looking at how computer programs presently function and how their 
“programming” does not constitute predictability. Interestingly, Putnam imagines an 
alien race appearing and claiming that we (human beings) were programmed artifacts 
and they (because they created us) know our every thought. Using the above logic, it 
should follow that since we are now programmed artifacts, that we were not conscious. 
Putnam also considers what he calls ‘Ziff’s argument’ (ibid., 687). In Ziff’s 
argument, we come across a plant and, upon closer inspection, it turns out to be 
composed of tubes, gears and wheels. It is more a mechanism than a plant. Now, given 
how we understand the meaning of the word ‘alive’, we can say “anything that is not 
alive is not conscious.” According to Ziff, we also tell whether or not something is alive 
based on its structure, not just its behavior. So the plant-like mechanism composed of 
tubes and gears is not alive, under this definition, therefore it cannot be conscious. But 
this understanding of ‘alive’ is too dogmatic, according to Putnam, and bases the idea 
of a “living thing” on privileging “soft stuff” over “hardware” (ibid, 686). 
This chapter looked at John Searle’s Chinese room experiment which tried to 
refute the claims of strong AI theorists that a symbol manipulating machine 
‘understood’ just like a human understands. The Churchlands and Searle both reject 
the Turing Test as sufficient for measuring consciousness and related phenomena. 
Daniel Dennett argues for its validity on the grounds that no other test has yet been 
imagined which would constitute a comprehensive enough show of intelligence to 
justify itself the way the Turing Test does. I also looked at some further objections from 







The question of whether or not computers can be creative is still open. I focused only 
on one argument against computer creativity: (1) creativity requires consciousness; (2) 
computers cannot be conscious; therefore, (3) computers cannot be creative. To better 
understand “creativity”, I looked at a core, intuitive sense of “creativity”, one which 
seems to imply that creativity must be the product of an agent’s actions since we 
justifiably give creators credit for their creative achievements. Though creativity 
consists of three parts (agent, process and artifact), understanding creativity 
particularly requires understanding of how the agent realized their creative ideas.  
I further focused on the first premise: ‘Creativity requires consciousness’.  
Historically, traditional views of creativity have given credit to the gods or divine 
madness, while the agent was the lucky beneficiary of the “gift”. While this view does 
not rule out a necessary role for consciousness in creativity, it downplays the agent’s 
role to one of recipient. Kant’s “genius view” also granted that the creative agent could 
be gifted with natural ability, but added that a creative agent must have taste, to 
distinguish their productive works from gifted nonsense.  
Taste, however, seems to imply conscious experience, that there must be 
something it is like to make evaluative judgments. I argued against this supposition 
about taste. A thermostat can be said to instantiate an evaluative ability, that of 
perceiving changes in temperature and implementing a programmed response. 
Additionally, I found that both purposefulness and evaluative ability could be primed 
and triggered by environmental cues. It is not entirely clear what the role of 
consciousness in taste is. The Surrealists, for example, found their “unconsciously 
generated artworks attracted their conscious approval once they had been formed” 
(Boden 2014, 235). However, taste is not a productive ability and as it was shown a 
computer can instantiate styles and moods, effectively simulating taste.  
  I put less emphasis on the question of whether computers can be conscious. I 
looked at Searle’s Chinese room experiment which was given to motivate the claim 
that simulation of a mental state does not qualify as the real thing. For example, 
simulated taste is not real taste. However, the main claim of Searle’s argument rests 
on the axiom that no amount of syntax can generate semantics. The Churchlands reject 
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that claim on the grounds that many naturally occurring phenomena operate similarly, 
such as light particles illuminating a room or inanimate matter constituting life. For 
them, the relevant mental processes are important. This is why they both reject the 
Turing Test as a test for intelligence or consciousness. However, Daniel Dennett shows 
that the Turing Test is not meant to prove intelligence or consciousness, but merely to 
serve as defeasible evidence for intelligence or consciousness. Given the subjective 
nature of consciousness, there may be no effective test to measure it completely 
reliably. But the Turing Test is robust enough that should a computer pass it, it may 
justify us thinking of them as conscious. 
In conclusion, I argued against the view that consciousness is necessary for 
creativity. However, if it should turn out that consciousness is necessary for creativity, 
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CAN COMPUTERS BE CREATIVE? 
[Kas arvutid saavad olla loovad?] 
 
It is sometimes claimed that computer automation of work will free people up to be 
more creative and that being creative is a way to add value to one’s life. However, if 
computers themselves become creative, then this might impede a human’s ability to 
add value to their life. This thesis investigates the question ‘Can computers be 
creative?’ by assessing the role that consciousness plays in creativity. Specifically, I 
assess the following argument against computer creativity: (1) creativity requires 
consciousness; (2) computers cannot be conscious; (3) therefore, computers cannot 
be creative. The first premise is challenged by cases where humans program 
computers to produce apparently creative (novel and valuable) results. However, in 
the relevant sense of “creativity”, creativity must result from the actions of an agent. 
Accordingly, I will focus on whether the agency that is required for creativity requires 
consciousness. I draw on literature from philosophy of creativity, philosophy of 
artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind to argue that consciousness is not 
necessary for creativity. I also present some considerations against the second 
premise, that computers cannot be conscious. 
 


